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Abstract
Proving security of device-independent (DI) cryptographic protocols has been regarded to be a com-
plex and tedious task. In this work we show that a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation
theorem” of Dupuis et al. [DFR16], can be effectively applied to give fully general proofs of DI secu-
rity. At a high level our technique amounts to establishing a reduction to the scenario in which the
untrusted device operates in an identical and independent way in each round of the protocol. This
makes the proof much simpler and yields significantly better, essentially tight, quantitative results when
considering general quantum adversaries, compared to what was known before.
As concrete applications we give simple and modular security proofs for DI quantum key distribution
and randomness expansion protocols based on the CHSH inequality. For both tasks we establish essen-
tially optimal key rates and noise tolerance. As loophole-free Bell tests are finally being realised, our
results considerably decrease the gap between theory and experiments, thereby marking an important
step towards practical DI protocols and their implementations.
1 Introduction
Device-independent cryptographic protocols aim at achieving an unprecedented level of security – with
guarantees that hold (almost) irrespective of the quality, or trustworthiness, of the complex physical devices
used to implement the protocol [ER14]. Security in such protocols is based on the statistics observed by the
honest parties when running the protocol, which allow them to decide whether the possibly faulty or even
malicious devices used pose any security risk.
As an example, consider the task of device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD). In a DIQKD
protocol the honest parties, called Alice and Bob, share a two-component device (where one component is
held by Alice and the other by Bob). The manufacturer of the device, who can be incompetent or even
malicious1, claims that by interacting with the device according to the protocol the honest parties will
eventually produce (with high probability) identical and secret keys, unknown even to her, as the result of
alleged measurements made by the device on the quantum state it contains. The device is far too complex
for Alice and Bob to open and asses whether it works as claimed and, maybe, even the manufacturer herself
cannot guarantee that its actions are exact and non-faulty at all times. Alice and Bob must therefore treat
the device as a black box with which they can only interact according to the protocol, and the protocol must
be “strong enough” such that its security can be proven based on those interactions alone.
It is already well known that device-independent protocols are made possible due to the phenomena of
quantum non-locality and the so-called Bell inequalities (see [Sca13, BCP+14] for excellent reviews on the
topic). In general, a Bell inequality [Bel64] can be thought of as a game2 played by the honest parties using
the device they share. The game has a special “feature” – any classical strategy (i.e., convex combination of
deterministic strategies) describing the behaviour of the device can result in at most a winning probability
ωc such that ωc < 1, while there exists a quantum strategy (i.e., measuring some entangled state) achieving
1For the formal characterisation of the possible actions of the manufacturer see Section 2.4.
2For an explicit example of a game see Section 2.3.
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a greater winning probability ωq > ωc. Hence, if the honest parties observe that using their device they can
win the game with probability ωq then they can conclude that their device must be non-local. The value of
the winning probability in a game is directly related to the amount of secret randomness produced during
the game [PAM+10, AMP12]. This can be used to prove security of the relevant protocol.
Indeed, in the past decade (and even earlier) many device-independent cryptographic protocols, based
on this idea, have been considered. A limited list includes QKD [BHK05, PAB+09, VV14], randomness
expansion [PAM+10, VV12, CY13, MS14a] and amplification [CR12, CSW14], verified quantum computa-
tion [GKW15, HPDF15], bit commitment [AMPS15] and weak string erasure [KW16].
For many cryptographic tasks proving security amounts to bounding the knowledge that an adversary
(a malicious party, or an eavesdropper) can gain about the output of the protocol. This knowledge, or
uncertainty, is modelled using the conditional min-entropy, which for the case of a classical output corresponds
to the maximum probability with which the adversary may guess the output of the protocol. In the case of
QKD, for example, the output is the raw key K, and proving security is essentially equivalent3 to establishing
a lower bound on the smooth conditional min-entropy Hεmin(K|E), where E is the quantum system held by
Eve, which can be initially correlated to the device producing K (for formal definitions see Section 2).
Evaluating the smooth min-entropy of a large system is often difficult, especially in the device-independent
setting where not much is known about the way K is produced. One assumption commonly used to simplify
this task is that the bits of K = K1, . . . ,Kn are created in an independent and identical way and hence K
itself is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable. That is, it is assumed that the
device held by Alice and Bob makes the same measurements on the same quantum states in every round of
the protocol i ∈ [n]. This means that the device is initialised with some (unknown) state which has a tensor
product structure ρ⊗nAB and that the measurements have a tensor product structure as well. In that case, the
total entropy in K can be easily related to the sum of the entropies in each round separately.4 A bound on
the entropy accumulated in one round can usually be derived using the expected winning probability in the
game played in that round (i.e., the Bell violation), which in turn can be easily estimated during the protocol
in the i.i.d. case using standard Chernoff-type bounds since the same game is just being played repeatedly
with the same strategy.
Unfortunately, even though quite convenient (and, in many cases, seemingly necessary) for the analysis,
the i.i.d. assumption is a very strong one in the device-independent scenario.5 In particular, under such an
assumption the device cannot use any internal memory (i.e., its actions in one round cannot depend on the
previous rounds) or even display time-dependent behaviour (due to inevitable imperfections for example).
When considering device-dependent QKD protocols, such as the BB84 protocol [BB84], and other device-
dependent quantum protocols, de Finetti theorems [Ren07, CKR09] can usually be used to reduce the task
of proving security in the most general case to that of proving security with an i.i.d. assumption as described
above. Unfortunately, the same theorems cannot be used in the device-independent case (one reason, for
example, is that they depend on the dimension of the underlying states, which is unknown in the device-
independent setting), and while other de Finetti-type theorems [CT09, AFR15] were developed for the case
in which the states and measurements are unknown it is still not clear how to use them in DIQKD security
proofs. Hence, in the device-independent setting, one could not simply reduce the general security proof to
the one proven under the i.i.d. assumption.
Without this assumption about the device, however, not much is a priori known about the structure
of K, the expected winning probability in one round of the protocol, nor the way the total entropy of K
is accumulated one round after the other (as the device might correlate the different rounds in an almost
arbitrary way). Therefore, security proofs that estimated Hεmin(K|E) directly for the most general case had
to use far more complicated techniques and statistical analysis compared to the i.i.d. case.6
3From that point onward standard classical post-processing steps, e.g., error correction and privacy amplification, suffice to
prove the security of the protocol; see Section 5 for the details.
4Formally the bound can be calculated using the quantum asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09] for example.
5The i.i.d. assumption is stronger in the device-independent case since there not only the state is unknown but also the
measurements. In contrast, in the device-dependent case, one usually anyhow considers i.i.d. measurements, as the measurement
devices are trusted.
6This led to non-optimal proofs, both readability- and parameter-wise (e.g., key rates or amount of tolerable noise). See
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1.1 Results and contributions
In this work we demonstrate that a newly developed tool, the “entropy accumulation theorem” [DFR16],
can be effectively applied to give proofs of security with essentially tight parameters for a broad range of
device-independent protocols. Our main contribution is a general framework, consisting of a flexible protocol
and analysis, for applying the EAT to establish quantitative results on device-independent security.
Our technique amounts to establishing a reduction to the i.i.d. setting, with the major advantage that
the reduction is virtually lossless in terms of parameters. As a consequence we are able to extend the tight
results known for, e.g., DIQKD under the i.i.d. assumption to the most general setting. Our technique is
simpler and allows for more modular protocols than previous ad-hoc approaches. As more and more device-
independent protocols are being considered, it is highly important to have a simple, yet strong, technique to
prove security.
The significance of our quantitative results is twofold. First, they establish the a priori surprising result
that general quantum adversaries do not force weaker rates compared to those achieved in less general
scenarios. That is, it is possible to achieve rate vs. noise tradeoffs which are as good as those achieved in
much more restricted settings such as under the i.i.d. assumption. Second, as loophole-free Bell tests (a
necessity for device-independent cryptography) are finally being realised [HBD+15, SMSC+15, GVW+15],
our rates further and considerably decrease the gap between theory and experiments, thereby marking
another important step towards practical device-independent protocols and their implementations.
We provide two concrete applications. To begin with, we consider a DIQKD protocol based on the CHSH
inequality and prove its security. The achieved key rates and noise tolerance are significantly higher than
previous works. For large enough number of rounds n, the key rate as a function of the noise tolerance
essentially coincides with the optimal result of [PAB+09], derived for the restricted i.i.d. and asymptotic
case. In particular, as in [PAB+09], we show that the protocol can tolerate up to the optimal error rate
of 7.1% while still producing a positive key rate. (For comparison7, in [VV14] the maximal noise tolerance
was 1.6%). Moreover, the achieved key rates are comparable to those achieved in device-dependent QKD
protocols [SR08a, SR08b] already starting from n = 106. (For further details and curves see Section 5.5.2).
As a second application we consider a randomness expansion protocol based on the CHSH inequality. Here
as well, we obtain an expansion rate which is essentially the same as the optimal rate achieved in [PAM+10]
in the case of classical adversaries only, while our result holds against quantum adversaries. This is much
better than the rates obtained in previous works [VV12, MS14a, MS14b].
Main ideas of the proof. The main tool used in the proof is the above mentioned entropy accumulation
theorem (EAT) [DFR16]. The EAT can be understood as some kind of a chain rule for the conditional
smooth min-entropy, which quantifies how entropy “accumulates” across many random variables generated
through a certain iterative quantum processes as long as it fulfils a number of conditions (see Section 2.6 for
the exact statement).
Our technical contribution consists in showing how the EAT can be used to provide a complete analysis
of security in the device-independent setting, with the additional benefit of yielding essentially optimal
parameters. Towards this we take the following three main steps. First, we propose a modular hypothetical
protocol that can be considered as a “skeleton” for many device-independent cryptographic tasks. This
protocol is fine-tuned such that the entropy generated throughout it can be analysed using the EAT, by
ensuring that the appropriate conditions are met, and such that it can be used as a building block in the
analysis of more complex protocols while preserving strong quantitative results. Next, we combine the results
of [PAB+09], derived for the i.i.d. case, with our protocol to get a good lower-bound on the generated entropy
rate when using the CHSH inequality. Finally, we show how the hypothetical protocol can be related to
actual more complex protocols of interest, such as DIQKD protocols. This relation is used to prove security
of a DIQKD protocol that we propose, with essentially optimal key rate and noise tolerance.
Section 1.2 for a discussion of related works.
7The noise models of the two works are a bit different; the value of 1.6% is the relevant one after equating the models.
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1.2 Related work
The idea of basing the security of cryptographic protocols (QKD especially) on the violation of Bell inequal-
ities originates in the celebrated work of Ekert [Eke91]. Later, Mayers and Yao [MY98] recognised that by
using Bell inequalities the underlying devices must not be trusted. Barrett et al. [BHK05] were the first to
combine both ideas together and derive a proof of security for QKD in the device-independent scenario. Their
security proof holds even in the presence of a super-quantum adversary, limited only by the non-signalling
principle. The protocol of [BHK05], however, could not tolerate any amount of noise and produced just one
secret bit when using the device many times.
Following these initial works a long line of research [AGM06, AMP06, SGB+06, ABG+07, Mas09,
PAB+09, HRW10, HR10, MPA11, MRC+14] led to protocols, and proof techniques, that establish non-
vanishing key rates with a positive noise tolerance in the i.i.d. setting, against quantum or super-quantum
adversaries (the former typically leading to better rates and noise tolerance). Most relevant for our work are
the results of Pironio et al. [PAB+09], where security of a DIQKD protocol was proven in the asymptotic
limit, i.e., when the device is used n → ∞ times, and under the i.i.d. assumption described above. Their
protocol is based on the CHSH inequality [CHSH69]. To the best of our knowledge, they provide the best
known rates under these assumptions.
The simpler tasks of randomness certification and expansion, first considered in [Col06], are the first to
have received a complete proof of security in the device-independent setting. Pironio et al. [PAM+10] showed,
in the non-i.i.d. setting, that a quadratic expansion was possible, but their analysis was limited to the case
of classical side information. Security against quantum side information was established in [VV12], where it
was shown that exponential expansion is possible. The analysis of [VV12], however, does not tolerate noise
in the devices; this was solved in [MS14a].
The maximum amount of randomness that can be generated from one system violating a specific Bell
inequality by a given amount has been well-studied. Pironio et al. [PAM+10] give tight bounds for the CHSH
game; see, e.g., [DPA13, LBS+14] for recent works exploring different aspects of the question. However, when
using the device repeatedly, in the non-i.i.d. setting, few works give explicit rates; to the best of our knowledge
the only quantitative results available are from [MS14b] (see also [PM13, FGS13] for an analysis in the non-
i.i.d case but under the assumption that the adversary holds only classical side information), and remain
relatively weak in comparison to the best one may expect from the known results under the i.i.d. assumption.
For the more challenging scenario of QKD, security in the non-i.i.d setting was first established in [VV14];
see also [RUV13], who give a secure protocol but with vanishing rate and no noise tolerance. A more recent
proof of security by Miller and Shi [MS14a] is closest to our results in that it bounds the amount of entropy
generated in the protocol in a round-by-round fashion, similar in spirit (but technically very different) from
our use of the EAT (see Section 2.6 for a description). The security proofs of the existing works are quite
complex and achieve relatively low key rates and noise tolerance (if any).
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2.
In Section 3 we show how the EAT can be used in device-independent protocols for a general Bell inequality.
Then, in Section 4 we explicitly calculate and plot the entropy rates for the case of the CHSH inequality.
We continue in Sections 5 and 6 with our DIQKD and randomness expansion protocols, respectively. We
end in Section 7 with some open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 General notation
All logarithms are in base 2. Random variables (RV) are denoted by capital letters while specific values are
denoted by small letters. We denote vectors in bold face; for example, X = X1, . . . , Xn is a vector of RV.
Sets are denoted with calligraphic fonts.
The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n].
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Given a value c = c1, . . . , cn ∈ Cn, where C is a finite alphabet, we denote by freqc the probability
distribution over C defined by freqc(c˜) = |{i|ci=c˜}|n for c˜ ∈ C. If ρCE is a state classical on C we write Pr [c]ρ
to denote the probability that ρ assigns to c.
For m ∈ N+, ρUm denotes the completely mixed state on m qubits and I is the identity operator.
For convenience all important parameters, constants, and random variables used in the paper are listed
in the tables in the appendix.
2.2 Entropies and Markov chains
Entropies and conditional entropies. h is used for the binary entropy function h(p) = −p log(p) −
(1 − p) log(1 − p). The von Neumann entropy H(ρ) of a quantum state ρ is given by H(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log ρ).
Given a bipartite state ρAE ∈ HA ⊗HE the conditional von Neumann entropy is defined as H(A|E)ρAE =
H(ρAE)−H(ρE). When the state on which the entropy is evaluated is clear from the context we drop the
subscript and write H(A|E).
Min-entropy. Given a state classical on A, ρAE =
∑
a pa |a〉〈a| ⊗ ρaE , the conditional min-entropy is
Hmin(A|E) = − log pguess(A|E) ,
where pguess(A|E) is the maximum probability of guessing A given the quantum system E:
pguess(A|E) = max{Ma
E
}a
∣∣∣∑
a
paTr(M
a
Eρ
a
E)
∣∣∣ ,
and the maximum is taken over all POVMs {MaE}a on E. For any quantum state ρAE , H(A|E) ≥ Hmin(A|E).
The smooth conditional min-entropy with smoothness parameter ε of a state ρAE is defined to be
Hεmin(A|E)ρAE = maxσAE∈Bε(ρAE)Hmin(A|E)σAE , for Bε(ρAE) the set of sub-normalised states σAE with
P (ρAE , σAE) ≤ ε, where P is the purified distance [TCR10].
Max-entropy. The quantum smooth max-entropy of a state ρAE is given by
Hεmax(A|E)ρAE = log inf
σAE∈Bε(ρAE)
sup
τE
‖σ 12AEτ
− 12
E ‖21 .
We will also use the closely related Hε0 entropy. For classical X and Y distributed according to PXY
H0(X|Y) = maxy log
∣∣Supp (PX|Y=y)∣∣, where Supp (PX|Y=y) = {x|PX|Y=y (x) > 0}. Its smooth version is
given by
Hε0 (X|Y) = min
Ω
max
y
log
∣∣Supp (PX|Ω,Y=y)∣∣ ,
where the minimum ranges over all events Ω with probability at least 1− ε.
Markov chains. A tripartite quantum state ρABC is said to fulfil the Markov chain condition A↔ B ↔ C
if I(A : C|B) = 0, where I(A : C|B) = H(AB) + H(BC) − H(B) − H(ABC) is the conditional mutual
information. I(A : C|B) = 0 if and only if given B, A and C are independent.8
2.3 Non-local games
We consider general two-player non-local games G and treat them as equivalent to bipartite Bell inequalities.
In a game G, the two players, Alice and Bob, share a bipartite quantum state. Given a question for Alice and
a question for Bob, they can choose how to measure their parts of the state, and then use the measurements
8There are also other equivalent ways of defining Markov chains for quantum states [HJPW04], but for our purposes this
definition suffices.
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outcomes to supply an answer each. They win if their answers fulfil a pre-defined requirement, called the
winning criterion.
More formally, the game G is defined via sets of questions and answers for Alice and Bob, X ,Y and A,B,
a distribution over X × Y (we will generally assume this is a product distribution), and a winning criterion
w : X × Y ×A× B → {0, 1}.9
A bipartite state ρQAQB , where Alice holds register QA and Bob register QB, together with local mea-
surements that each player performs on his or her register in order to determine the answer to the given
question define a strategy for the players in a game G. We use ω ∈ [0, 1] to denote the winning probability
of a strategy in the game G.
The CHSH game. We use a variant of the CHSH game previously used in [PAB+09, VV14] in the context
of DIQKD. In this game Alice has two possible inputs X = {0, 1} and Bob three possible inputs Y = {0, 1, 2}.
The output sets are A = B = {0, 1}. The winning condition is the following:10
wCHSH =


1 x, y ∈ {0, 1} and a⊕ b = x · y
1 (x, y) = (0, 2) and a = b
1 (x, y) = (1, 2)
0 otherwise.
The optimal quantum strategy for this game is the same as in the standard CHSH game [CHSH69], except
that if Bob’s input is a 2 he applies the same measurement as Alice’s s measurement on input 0. Since the
underlying state is maximally entangled this ensures that their outputs will always match when (x, y) = (0, 2).
Conditioned on Bob’s input not being 2, the game played is the CHSH game. The optimal quantum
strategy achieves winning probability ω = 2+
√
2
4 ≈ 0.85, while the optimal classical strategy achieves a
winning probability of 0.75.
Instead of describing the quantum advantage in the game in terms of the winning probability one can
also work with the correlation coefficients defined by: Exy = Pr[a = b|x, y] − Pr[a 6= b|xy] for any pair of
inputs (x, y). The CHSH value is then given by β = E00 + E01 + E10 − E11. We have β ∈ [2, 2
√
2], where
β = 2 is the optimal classical violation while β = 2
√
2 is the quantum one. The relation between the winning
probability in the CHSH game and the CHSH value is given by ω = 1/2 + β/8 and we have ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
.
2.4 Untrusted device
In a device-independent protocol the honest parties interact with an untrusted device. We now explain what
is meant by this term and what are the assumptions regarding such a device. For simplicity we consider the
case of two honest parties, Alice and Bob, but this can be extended to more parties in the obvious way.
A device D is modelled by a tripartite apparatus (including both state and measurements devices),
distributed between Alice, Bob, and the adversary Eve. We think of the device as being prepared by Eve,
and hence we call it untrusted. This allows Eve, in particular, to keep a purification of Alice and Bob’s
quantum state in a quantum register in her possession.11 Although the device is untrusted we always
assume that the following requirements hold (some of these requirements can be verified).
The device can be used to run the considered protocol. That is, Alice and Bob can interact with
D according to the relevant protocol (for an example of a protocol, see Protocol 1 below). Alice and Bob’s
components of D implement the protocol by making sequential measurements on quantum states. In each
9A general Bell inequality would allow for an R-valued w; we will not need this here.
10For the inputs (x, y) = (1, 2) one can set either wCHSH = 1 or 0 (it is not relevant later on); for completeness we choose
wCHSH = 1 in this case, following previous works.
11We emphasise that Eve is not required to measure her quantum state at any particular point. During the run of the
considered protocol, Eve can eavesdrop on all the classical communication between the honest parties, and can later choose to
measure her quantum register depending on this information.
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round of the protocol, we say that the device is implementing some strategy for the game G being played.
The device may have memory, and thus apply a different strategy each time the game is played, depending
on the previous rounds. Therefore, the measurement operators may change in each round, and the state on
which the measurements are performed may be the post-measurement state from the previous round, a new
state, or any combination of these two.
We sometimes use the terminology honest device or honest implementation. A device is said to be honest
if it implements the protocol by using a certain pre-specified strategy. In that case, the actions of the device
are known and fixed (noise can still be present).
Communication (signalling) between the components of the device. The communication between
Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components is restricted in the following way:
1. Alice and Bob’s components of D cannot signal to Eve’s component.
2. Alice and Bob can decide when to allow communication (if any) between their components. This
ensures that the underlying quantum state of Alice and Bob’s components of the device is (at least)
bipartite and that the measurements made in the two components, in each round, are in tensor product
with one another.
3. Alice and Bob can decide when to receive communication (if any) from Eve’s component.
The requirement given in Item 1 is necessary for device-independent cryptography; without it the device
could directly send to Eve all the raw data it generated.
Item 2 implies that Alice and Bob’s component must be (at least) bipartite. This is necessary to assure
that the violation of the considered Bell inequality is meaningful and implies security.
Items 2 and 3 give Alice, Bob, and Eve’s components the possibility to communicate in certain stages of
the protocol. This is not a restrictive nor necessary assumption. This possibility to communicate is added
since it is advantageous to actual implementations of certain protocols. To be specific, we consider the
following scenario. In-between different rounds of the protocol, Alice and Bob’s components of the device are
allowed to communicate freely. During the execution of a single round, however, no communication is allowed.
In particular, when the game is being played, there is no communication between the components once the
honest parties’ inputs are chosen and until the outputs are supplied by the device.12 Furthermore, in-between
rounds Eve may send information to the device, but not receive any from it. In actual implementations
this implies that entanglement can be distributed “on the fly” for each round of the protocol, instead of
maintaining large quantum memories.
Other assumptions. Apart from the above description of the untrusted device, we assume the following
other standard assumptions used in device-independent cryptography:
1. The honest parties’ physical locations are secure (unwanted information cannot leak outside to Eve or
between their devices).
2. The honest parties have a trusted random number generator.
3. The honest parties have a trusted classical post-processing units to make the necessary (classical)
calculations during the protocol.
4. There is a classical authenticated, but public, classical channel connecting the honest parties (if nec-
essary).
5. Quantum physics is correct.
12To be more precise and concrete, in Protocol 1 for example, communication is allowed in every round i right after Step 7
is done, and until the beginning of round i+ 1, i.e., before Ti+1 is chosen.
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2.5 Security definitions
DIQKD. A DIQKD protocol (see Section 5 for a description of an explicit protocol) consists of an inter-
action between two trusted parties, Alice and Bob, and an untrusted device as defined in Section 2.4. At
the end of the protocol each party outputs a key, K˜A for Alice and K˜B for Bob. The goal of the adversary,
Eve, is to gain as much information as possible about Alice and Bob’s keys without being detected (i.e., in
the case where the protocol is not being aborted).
Correctness, secrecy, and overall security of a protocol are defined as follows (see also [PR14, Bea15]):
Definition 1 (Correctness). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εcorr-correct, when implemented using a device
D, if Alice and Bob’s keys, K˜A and K˜B respectively, are identical with probability at least 1 − εcorr. That
is, Pr(K˜A 6= K˜B) ≤ εcorr.
Definition 2 (Secrecy). A DIQKD protocol is said to be εsec-secret, when implemented using a device D,
if for a key of length l, (1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρK˜AE − ρUl ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsec, where E is a quantum register that may
initially be correlated with D.
εsec in the above definition can be understood as the probability that some non-trivial information leaks
to the adversary [PR14].
If a protocol is εcorr-correct and εsec-secret (for a given D), then it is ε
s
QKD-correct-and-secret for any
εsQKD ≥ εcorr + εsec.
Definition 3 (Security). A DIQKD protocol is said to be (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD, l)-secure if:
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the device D it is εsQKD-correct-and-secret.
2. (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the device D such that the protocol does
not abort with probability greater than 1− εcQKD.
The protocols that we consider below take into account possible noise in the honest implementation. That
is, even when there is no adversary at all, the actual implementation of the devices might not be perfect.
Thus, the completeness of the protocol implies its robustness to the desired amount of noise.
Lastly, a remark regarding the composability of this security definition is in order. A security definition
is said to be composable [Can01, BOM04, PR14] if it implies that the protocol can be used arbitrarily and
composed with other protocols (proven secure by themselves), without compromising security. Obviously,
if Alice and Bob wish to use the keys they produced in the DIQKD protocol in some other cryptographic
protocol (i.e., they compose the two protocols), it is necessary for them to use protocols which were proven
to have composable security.
For the case of (device-dependent) QKD, Definition 3 was rigorously proven to be composable [PR14].
This suggests that the same security definition should also be the relevant one in the device-independent
context and, indeed, as far as we are aware, it is the definition that has been used in all prior works on device-
independent cryptography. Nevertheless, the claim that Definition 3 is composable for device-independent
protocols as well has never been rigorously proven, and the result of [BCK13] suggests that this is not the
case when the same devices are reused in the composition. We still use this definition as it seems like the
most promising security definition to date. This implies that, as in all other works, after the end of the
protocol the device cannot be used again in general [BCK13].
Randomness expansion. In the task of randomness expansion there is a single user interacting sequen-
tially with an untrusted device. At the start of the interaction the user is presented with a source R ∈ {0, 1}r
of uniformly random bits. The user then interacts sequentially with the device in a deterministic way (the
only sources of randomness being the initial string R and any randomness which may be present in the de-
vices’ outputs). At the end of the protocol the user returns a string Z ∈ {0, 1}m of m bits that is statistically
close to uniform, conditioned on R as well as any side information of the adversary. (See Section 6 for a
concrete example of a randomness expansion protocol.) More formally, we require the following.
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Definition 4 (Security of randomness expansion). A protocol is called an (εcRE , ε
s
RE)-secure r → m ran-
domness expansion protocol13 if, given r uniformly random bits:
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the device D it either aborts or returns a classical string
Z ∈ {0, 1}m and we have
(1− Pr[abort]) ‖ρZRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUr ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ εsRE ,
where E is a quantum register that may initially be correlated with D.
2. (Completeness) There exists an honest implementation of the device such that the protocol does not
abort with probability greater than 1− εcRE .
As in the case of DIQKD, this security definition was not proven to be composable in general.
2.6 The entropy accumulation theorem
The main tool used in this work is the EAT [DFR16, Theorem 4.4]. Below we give the necessary details in
a notation appropriate for our work (although less general than the original EAT).
We work with channels with the following properties:
Definition 5 (EAT channels). EAT channels Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi, for i ∈ [n], are CPTP maps such
that for all i ∈ [n]:
1. Ai, Bi, Ii and Ci are finite-dimensional classical systems (RV). Ai and Bi or of dimension dAi and dBi
respectively. Ri are arbitrary quantum registers.
2. For any input state σRi−1R′ , where R
′ is a register isomorphic to Ri−1, the output state σRiAiBiIiCiR′ =
(Ni ⊗ IR′)
(
σRi−1R′
)
has the property that the classical value Ci can be measured from the marginal
σAiBiIi without changing the state.
3. For any initial state ρ0R0E , the final state ρABICE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗IE ρ0R0E fulfils the Markov
chain condition A1...i−1B1...i−1 ↔ I1...i−1E ↔ Ii for each i ∈ [n].
Definition 6 (Tradeoff functions). Let N1, . . . ,NN be a family of EAT channels. Let C denote the common
alphabet of C1, . . . , Cn. A function fmin from the set of probability distributions p over C to the real numbers
is called a min-tradeoff function for {Ni} if it satisfies14
fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|IiR′)Ni(σ)
for all i ∈ [n], where the infimum is taken over all input states of Ni for which the marginal on Ci of the
output state is the probability distribution p.
Similarly, a function fmax from the set of probability distributions p over C to the real numbers is called
a max-tradeoff function for {Ni} if it satisfies
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|IiR′)Ni(σ)
for all i ∈ [n], where the supremum is taken over all input states of Ni for which the marginal on Ci of the
output state is the probability distribution p.
13All parameters εcRE , ε
s
RE , r and m will in general be function of a parameter n that also parametrises the protocol and the
number of rounds of interactions between the user and the device.
14The infimum and supremum over the empty set are defined as plus and minus infinity, respectively.
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Theorem 7 (EAT [DFR16]). Let Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi for i ∈ [n] be EAT channels as in Definition 5,
ρABICE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE ρR0E be the final state, Ω an event defined over Cn, pΩ the probability
of Ω in ρ, and ρ|Ω the final state conditioned on Ω. Let εs ∈ (0, 1).
For fmin a min-tradeoff function for {Ni}, as in Definition 6, and any t ∈ R such that fmin (freqc) ≥ t
for any c ∈ Cn for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0,
Hεsmin (AB|IE)ρ|Ω > nt− v
√
n ,
where v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmin‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · pΩ) and dAiBi denotes the dimension of AiBi.
Similarly, for fmax a max-tradeoff function for {Ni} as in Definition 6 and any t ∈ R such that
fmax (freqc) ≤ t for any c ∈ Cn for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0,
Hεsmax (AB|IE)ρ|Ω < nt+ v
√
n ,
where v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmax‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · pΩ).
To gain a bit of intuition on how Theorem 7 is going to be used note the following. The event Ω will
usually be the event of the considered protocol not aborting (or a closely related event). The relevant state
for which the smooth min- or max-entropy is going to be evaluated is ρ|Ω. To use the theorem, it should
be possible to define some EAT channels {Ni} that produce the final state ρ from the initial state ρR0 by
applying the channels sequentially; these channels are not necessarily the channels used in the actual protocol
to produce ρ. The tradeoff functions can be seen as a bound on the entropy accumulated in one round i,
and, if such a bound t exists, then Theorem 7 asserts that the total amount of entropy, accumulated in all
rounds i = 1 to n together, is roughly n times t. It is in this sense that the theorem essentially allows us to
perform a reduction to the i.i.d. setting.
3 Device-independent entropy accumulation protocol
The main task in proving security of DIQKD and other protocols is to prove a bound on the (smooth)
min-entropy of the raw data held by Alice and Bob, conditioned on all the information available to the
adversary Eve. The goal of this section is to show how the EAT (Theorem 7) can be used in a general
device-independent setting to achieve such a bound.
For this we consider the entropy accumulation protocol, described as Protocol 1 below. Although we call
it a “protocol”, one should see it more as a mathematical tool which allows us to use the EAT rather than
an actual protocol to be implemented.15 To be more specific, the EAT channels (as in Definition 5) will be
defined via the steps made in the entropy accumulation protocol. The relevance of the protocol stems from
the fact that the final state at the end of the protocol, on which a smooth min-entropy bound can be proven
using the EAT, is the same state as (or can easily be related to) the final state in the actual protocol to be
executed (depending on the specific application).
3.1 The protocol
Protocol 1 is used to generate raw data for Alice and Bob by using an untrusted device D. It is based on an
arbitrary non-local game G as defined in Section 2.3, together with a definition of test and generation inputs
for Alice and Bob. The test inputs, Xt ⊂ X and Yt ⊂ Y, are used by the parties during the test rounds
(Ti = 1 below) from which the Bell violation is estimated, while the generation inputs, Xg ⊂ X and Yg ⊂ Y,
are used in the other rounds (the sets are not necessarily disjoint). Ideally, one should use a game G for
which Alice and Bob’s outputs are perfectly correlated (or anti-correlated) with sufficiently high probability
when the parties use the generation inputs.16
15In particular, in a setting with two distinct parties, Alice and Bob, communication is required to actually implement it.
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Protocol 1 Entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
G – two-player non-local game
Xg,Xt ⊂ X – generation and test inputs for Alice
Yg,Yt ⊂ Y – generation and test inputs for Bob
D – untrusted device of (at least) two components that can play G repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-6:
2: Alice and Bob choose Ti ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose inputs Xi ∈ Xg and Yi ∈ Yg respectively. If Ti = 1 they choose inputs
Xi ∈ Xt and Yi ∈ Yt.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
5: (Optional symmetrisation step:) Alice and Bob choose together a (random) value Fi, and respectively
update their outputs Ai, Bi depending on Fi.
6: If Ti = 0 then Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥, and they set Ci =⊥. If Ti = 1 they set Ci = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi).
7: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n .
R0
E
ρ0
QAQBE
R1
O1
N1
ρ1
QAQB
R2
O2
N2
ρ2
QAQB
Ri−1 Ri
Oi
Ni
ρi−1
QAQB
ρi
QAQB
Rn−1 Rn
On
Nn
ρn−1
QAQB
ρn
QAQB
Figure 1: The EAT channels Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiCi. In the figure, Oi = AiBiXiYiTiCi. The initial
quantum state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve is ρ0QAQBE and the sequence of maps Ni creates the state
ρnQAQBEO.
We now define the EAT channels using the rounds of the protocol (where one round includes Steps 2-6
in Protocol 1). For this, the following notation is used. For every i ∈ {0} ∪ [n], the (unknown) quantum
state of the device D shared by Alice and Bob after round i of the protocol is denoted by ρiQAQB . We denote
the register holding this state by Ri. In particular, R0 ≡ QAQB at the start of the protocol. At Step 7
in Protocol 1, the quantum state of the devices is changed from ρi−1QAQB in Ri−1 to ρ
i
QAQB
in Ri by the
use of the device.17 Our EAT channels are then Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiXiYiTiCi defined by the CPTP map
describing the i-th round of Protocol 1, as implemented by the untrusted device D (see Figure 1). We prove
in Lemma 9 below that they indeed satisfy the conditions given in Definition 5.
We ignore this here as it is not relevant for the analysis.
16In a DIQKD protocol (or other tasks with two separated honest parties) this requirement is used to ensure a good key
rate, as the output bits in the generation rounds will be the main contributors to the final key. For tasks such as randomness
expansion, where there is only one honest party, it is not necessary to generate matching outputs.
17To be a bit more precise, the quantum state is changed in two steps. First, the relevant measurement of Step 7 is done
(where it is assumed that the measurements of the different components are in tensor product). Then, after Ai and Bi are
recorded, the different components of the device are allowed to communicate. Thus, some further changes can be made to the
post-measurement state even based on the memory of all components together.
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In the following we are interested in the state of Alice, Bob, and Eve after the n-th round of the protocol,
both before and after Alice and Bob decide whether to abort or not in Step 10. The state before Step 10 is
denoted by
ρABXYTCE = (TrRn ◦ Nn ◦ · · · ◦ N1)⊗ IE ρ0QAQBE . (1)
In Step 10 Alice and Bob decide whether they should abort the protocol or not according to the estimated
Bell violation in the test rounds. Let Ω denote the event that they do not abort18, i.e.,
Ω =
{∑
j
Cj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n
}
. (2)
The final state, conditioned on not aborting, is denoted by ρABXYTCE|Ω or just ρ|Ω to ease notation.
Below we bound the entropy which is accumulated in this state during the rounds of the protocol.
3.2 Completeness
Suppose that Alice and Bob execute Protocol 1 with a device D which performs i.i.d. measurements on a
tensor product state ρ⊗nQAQB such that the winning probability achieved in game G by the device D executed
on a single state ρQAQB is ωexp. We call any such implementation an honest implementation. The following
lemma bounds the probability of Protocol 1 aborting in an honest implementation.
Lemma 8. Protocol 1 is complete with completeness error εcEA ≤ exp(−2nδ2est). That is, the probability that
the protocol aborts for an honest implementation of the devices D is at most εcEA.
Proof. Alice and Bob abort in Step 10 when the sum of the Ci is not sufficiently high (this happens when
the estimated Bell violation is too low or when not enough test rounds were chosen). In the honest imple-
mentation Ci are i.i.d. RVs with E [Ci] = ωexpγ. Therefore, we can use Hoeffding’s inequality:
εcEA = Pr

∑
j
Cj ≥ (ωexpγ − δest) · n

 ≤ exp(−2nδ2est) . (3)
3.3 Soundness
The EAT, Theorem 7, almost immediately provides a general lower bound on the amount of entropy generated
by Protocol 1. We state the result as Lemma 9 below; in Section 4 we will obtain a more refined bound
based on an instantiation of the protocol with the game G taken to be the CHSH game.
Lemma 9. Let D be any device, and for i ∈ [n] let Ii = XiYiTiFi and Ni : Ri−1 → RiAiBiIiCi the CPTP
map implemented by the i-th round of Protocol 1. Let ρ be the state generated by the protocol (as defined in
Equation (1)), Ω the event that the protocol does not abort (as defined in Equation (2)), and ρ|Ω the state
conditioned on Ω. Let fmin be a real-valued function defined on the set of probability distributions p over the
alphabet {⊥, 0, 1} of Ci such that
∀i ∈ [n] fmin(p) ≤ inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) , (4)
where the infimum over an empty set is defined as infinity. Then, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol
aborts with probability 1− Pr(Ω) ≥ 1− εEA or,
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > nt− v
√
n, (5)
18Note that Cj ∈ {0, 1,⊥}; the quantity
∑
j Cj should be understood as
∑
j|Cj=1
1.
12
where
t = min
p: p(1)≥ωexpγ−δest
fmin(p) ,
v = 2 (log(1 + 2dAiBi) + ⌈‖▽fmin‖∞⌉)
√
1− 2 log(εs · εEA)
and dAiBi denotes the dimension of AiBi.
Proof. In order to apply the EAT we first verify that the conditions stated in Definition 5 are fulfilled. Using
that Ci is a function of Ai, Bi, Xi, and Yi the first two conditions in Definition 5 clearly hold. Moreover, the
Markov chain condition
∀i ∈ [n], A1...iB1...i ↔ X1...iY1...iT1...iF1...iE ↔ Xi+1Yi+1Ti+1Fi+1
holds as well since the values of Xi+1, Yi+1, Ti+1, and Fi+1 are chosen independently of everything else at
each round. To conclude, note the event Ω of the protocol not aborting implies that the fraction of successful
game rounds freqc(1) is at least ωexpγ − δest for any c for which Pr [c]ρ|Ω > 0.
The main work remaining for a successful use of Protocol 1 for entropy generation consists in obtaining
a good lower bound in Equation (5), i.e., devising an appropriate min-tradeoff function fmin satisfying
Equation (4). In order to understand the task to be accomplished note that Ni defines Xi, Yi, Ti, and Fi,
so although the infimum in Equation (4) is taken over all states σ the distributions of Xi, Yi, Ti, and Fi are
fixed. Moreover, the infimum is only taken over states with Ni(σ)Ci = p, a condition which fixes the Bell
violation achieved by σ under the bipartite measurement performed by the device. This is precisely the sense
in which the EAT can be understood as providing a reduction to the i.i.d. case.
Lower bounds of the form of Equation (4) of different quality can be obtained depending on the specific
Bell inequality employed in the protocol. A general method consists in using the chain rule to write
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) = H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) +H (Bi|XiYiTiFiR′Ai)Ni(σ) (6)
≥ Hmin (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ)
Note that here the random variable Fi depends on the (optional) symmetrisation step, and was introduced
precisely to enable an easier lower bound on the quantities above; we will show how it can be used in the
specific case of the CHSH game in the next section.
A bound using the min-entropyHmin, instead ofH itself, is not tight in general, and one can expect to lose
quite a lot by performing the relaxation above (see for example Figure 2). The advantage, however, is that a
lower bound on Hmin (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) can be found using general techniques based on the semidefinite
programming (SDP) hierarchies of [NPA08]. For a slightly better bound one should not drop the second term
in Equation (6). A bound on Hmin (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) (usually called “global randomness”) can also
be found using the SDP hierarchies (see, e.g., [PAM+10]). For further details and references see [BCP+14,
Section IV-C].
4 A bound for the CHSH game
In this section we devise a specific min-tradeoff function fmin which, through an application of Lemma 9,
leads to a concrete bound on the entropy generated by Protocol 1 when the game G is the CHSH game
(described in Section 2.3).
We use Protocol 1 with the following choices: Xg = {0}, Xt = {0, 1}, Yg = {2}, and Yt = {0, 1}.
In order to fully specify the protocol it suffices to describe the symmetrisation step. In this step, Alice
and Bob choose together a uniform bit Fi, and they both flip their output bits if and only if Fi = 1. This
symmetrisation is helpful in the proof of the main theorem below. The downside is that it costs a lot of
randomness to implement, which can be problematic for some applications such as randomness expansion.
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Figure 2: The lower bounds on H
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
and Hmin
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
as a function of the Bell
violation for the CHSH inequality. The bound on H
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
is given in Equation (13) while the
bound on Hmin
(
Ai|XiYiTiR′i−1
)
can be taken from [MPA11]; both bounds are tight. For non-optimal Bell
violation the min-entropy is significantly lower than the entropy.
At the end of the section we show that the step is in fact not necessary in any real implementation of the
protocol.
The rate of entropy generation is governed by the following functions, where h is the binary entropy and
γ, p(1) ∈ (0, 1]:
g(p) =


1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
0, 2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
fmin (p, pt) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pt(1)
d
dp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pt
· p(1) +
(
g(pt)− ddp(1)g(p)
∣∣
pt
· pt(1)
)
p(1) > pt(1) ,
η(p, pt, εs, εe) = fmin (p, pt)− 1√
n
2
(
log 13 +
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pt
)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
ηopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<
pt(1)
γ
< 2+
√
2
4
η(ωexpγ − δest, pt, εs, εe) . (7)
Theorem 10 (Main theorem). Let D be any device, ρ the state (as defined in Equation (1)) generated using
Protocol 1 when the game G is the CHSH game, Ω (as defined in Equation (2)) the event that the protocol
does not abort, and ρ|Ω the state conditioned on Ω. Then, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts
with probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(εs, εEA) , (8)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (7).
The rate ηopt as a function of the expected Bell violation ωexp is plotted in Figure 3 for γ = 1 and several
choices of values for εEA, δest, and n. For comparison, we also plot in Figure 3 the asymptotic rate (n→∞)
under the assumption that the state of the device is an (unknown) i.i.d. state ρ⊗nQAQBE . In this case, the
quantum asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09, Theorems 1 and 9] implies that the optimal rate is the
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i.i.d. asymptotic rate
n = 108, δest = 10−3, εs = εEA = 10
−6
n = 107, δest = 10−3, εs = εEA = 10
−5
n = 107, δest = 10−3, εs = εEA = 10
−6
n = 106, δest = 10−3, εs = εEA = 10
−3
n = 106, δest = 10−3, εs = εEA = 10
−4
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−5
n = 105, δest = 10−2, εs = εEA = 10
−3
Figure 3: ηopt(ωexp) for γ = 1 and several choices of δest, n, εEA, and the smoothing parameter εs. Note
that for the errors of the protocols to be meaningful the number of rounds n should be at least of order δ−2est .
εEA and εs affect the soundness error in the protocols of the following sections. The dashed line shows the
optimal asymptotic (n→∞) rate under the assumption that the devices are such that Alice, Bob, and Eve
share an (unknown) i.i.d. state.
Shannon entropy accumulated in one round of the protocol (as given in Equation (13)). This rate, appearing
as the dashed line in Figure 3, is an upper bound on the entropy that can be accumulated. One can see that
as the number of rounds in the protocol increases our rate ηopt approaches this optimal rate.
Proof of Theorem 10. Based on Lemma 9, it will suffice to define a min-tradeoff function fmin such that
Equation (4) is satisfied. Using the chain rule,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) .
Furthermore,
H (Ai|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) = Pr [Xi = 0] ·H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ)
+ Pr [Xi = 1] ·H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 1)Ni(σ) .
(9)
In the following we find a bound on H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ). Using exactly the same steps the same
bound can be derived on H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 1)Ni(σ).
Due to the bipartite requirement on the untrusted device D used to implement the protocol and since
Alice’s actions (and her device’s) are independent of Bob’s choice of Yi and Ti for the case Xi = 0 we have
19
H (Ai|YiTiFiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) = H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) .
19We assume that the value of Ti is exchanged over a classical authenticated channel to which the device D does not have
access. In particular, Alice’s part of the device is independent from the value of Ti.
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Using the definition of the conditional entropy one can rewrite H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0)Ni(σ) as follows:
H (Ai|FiR′, Xi = 0) = H (AiFiR′|Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Xi = 0)
= H (Ai|Xi = 0) +H (FiR′|Ai, Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Xi = 0)
= H (Ai|Xi = 0)− χ (Ai : FiR′|Xi = 0)
= 1− χ (Ai : FiR′|Xi = 0) , (10)
where χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) = H (FiR′|Xi = 0)−H (FiR′|Ai, Xi = 0) and the last equality follows from the
symmetrisation step, Step 5.
For states leading to a CHSH violation of β ∈ [2, 2√2] (for inputs restricted to {0, 1} × {0, 1}) a tight
bound on χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) was derived in [PAB+09, Section 2.3]:
χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) ≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
β2
4
− 1
)
. (11)
Since ω = 18β +
1
2 , for ω ∈
[
3
4 ,
2+
√
2
4
]
(i.e. a violation in the quantum regime) we get
χ (Ai : FiR
′|Xi = 0) ≤ h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
.
Combining this bound with Equations (9) and (10) we conclude that for a state with winning probability ω,
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ω (ω − 1) + 3
)
. (12)
Consider a probability distribution p = freqc resulting from the observed data. If p(0) + p(1) 6= γ then
the set of states fulfilling Ni(σ)Ci = p is empty and the condition on the min-tradeoff function given in
Definition 6 becomes trivial. Hence, for the construction of the min-tradeoff function we can restrict our
attention to p with p(0) + p(1) = γ. For such p we can write ω = p(1)p(0)+p(1) =
p(1)
γ . All together we have for
all p,
inf
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)Ci=p
H (AiBi|XiYiTiFiR′)Ni(σ) ≥ 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p(1)
γ
(
p(1)
γ
− 1
)
+ 3
)
. (13)
Define a function g by
g(p) =


1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p(1)γ
(
p(1)
γ − 1
)
+ 3
)
p(1)
γ ∈
[
0, 2+
√
2
4
]
1 p(1)γ ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
.
(14)
From Equation (13) it follows that any choice of fmin(p) that is differentiable and satisfies fmin(p) ≤ g(p)
for all p will satisfy Equation (4).
For p(1)γ =
2+
√
2
4 the derivative of g is infinite. For the final bound of the EAT to be meaningful fmin
should be chosen such that ‖▽fmin‖∞ is finite. To remedy this problem we choose fmin by “cutting” the
function g and “gluing” it to a linear function at some point pt (which is later optimised), while keeping the
function differentiable. By doing this we ensure that the gradient of fmin is bounded, at the cost of losing a
bit of entropy for p with p(1) > pt(1). Towards this, denote
a(pt) =
d
dp(1)
g(p)
∣∣
pt
and b(pt) = g(pt)− a(pt) · pt(1). (15)
16
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Figure 4: The construction of the min-tradeoff function fmin as in Equation (16). The plot shows the values
of the min-tradeoff function on a slice p(0) + p(1) = constant.
We then make the following choice20 for the min-tradeoff function fmin (see Figure 4):
fmin (p, pt) =
{
g (p) p(1) ≤ pt(1)
a(pt) · p(1) + b(pt) p(1) > pt(1)
(16)
From the definition of a and b in Equation (15) this function is differentiable and fulfils the condition given
in Equation (4). Furthermore, by definition for any choice of pt it holds that ‖▽fmin(·, pt)‖∞ ≤ a(pt).
Applying Lemma 9, we conclude that for any 34 <
pt(1)
γ <
2+
√
2
4 , either the protocol aborts with proba-
bility greater than 1− εEA, or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > nfmin (ωexpγ − δest, pt)−
√
nζ(pt) , (17)
for ζ(pt, εs, εAE) = 2 (log 13 + a(pt))
√
1− 2 log(εs · εAE) (as dAiBi = 6). To obtain the optimal rate we
optimise over pt . Denote η(p, pt, εs, εAE) = fmin (p, pt)− 1√nζ(pt, εs, εAE) and let
ηopt(εs, εAE) = max
3
4<
pt(1)
γ
< 2+
√
2
4
η(ωexpγ − δest, pt, εs, εAE) .
Plugging this into Equation (17) the theorem follows.
We end this section by showing how the particular implementation of the symmetrisation step, Step 5,
of Protocol 1 made here for the CHSH game can be ignored in any implementation of the protocol. For this,
rewrite Equation (30) more formally as21
Hεsmin (gF (AB) |XYTFE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt , (18)
where gF is the function that flips the bits according to F. Since for any fixed value of F , gF is a deterministic
function it follows from [SR08b, Lemma 1] that for any εs ≥ 0,
Hεsmin (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω ≥ H
εs
min (gF (AB) |XYTFE)ρ|Ω . (19)
20Note that fmin is nonpositive for
p(1)
γ
≤ 3/4, but this regime is not relevant as it would lead to the protocol aborting; the
extension of fmin to that range of values is only for mathematical convenience.
21Previously for ease of notation we wrote AB for the flipped outputs; here we denote the same bits as gF (AB) to make the
flipping operation explicit.
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Combining Equations (18) and (19) proves the following corollary.
Corollary 11. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 10, but for an implementation of Protocol 1 in
which the symmetrisation step, Step 5, is omitted, for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts with
probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(εs, εEA) , (20)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (7).
In Appendix B we use a small modification of the entropy accumulation protocol and the above proof to
get a similar bound on the entropy rate which has a better dependency on the probability of a test γ. This
is of relevance for some applications such as DIQKD. The calculations presented in Appendix B are slightly
more technical than the proof given above, but do not require any substantially different observations.
5 DIQKD
5.1 The protocol
Our protocol for DIQKD is described as Protocol 2 below. An honest implementation is described in
Section 5.2.
In the first part of the protocol Alice and Bob use their devices to produce the raw data, similarly to
what is done in the entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1 (with the game G equal to the CHSH game,
as in Section 4). The main difference is that Bob’s outputs always contains Bob’s i-th measurement outcome
(instead of being set to ⊥ in all rounds for which Ti = 0); to make the distinction explicit we denote Bob’s
outputs in Protocol 2 with a tilde, B˜.
In the second part of the protocol Alice and Bob apply classical post-processing steps to produce their
final keys. We choose classical post-processing steps that optimise the key rate, but which may not be
optimal in other aspects, e.g., computation time. The protocol and the analysis can easily be adapted for
other choices of classical post-processing.
We now describe the three post-processing steps, error correction, parameter estimation and privacy
amplification, in detail.22
Error correction. Alice and Bob use an error correction protocol EC to obtain identical raw keys KA and
KB from their bits A, B˜. In our analysis we use a protocol, based on universal hashing, which minimises
the amount of leakage to the adversary [BS93, RW05] (see also Section 3.3.2 in [Bea15] for details). To
implement this protocol Alice chooses a hash function and sends the chosen function and the hashed value
of her bits to Bob. We denote this classical communication by O. Bob uses O, together with his prior
knowledge B˜XYT, to compute a guess Aˆ for Alice’s bits A. If EC fails to produce a good guess Alice and
Bob abort; in an honest implementation this happens with probability at most εcEC. If Alice and Bob do not
abort then they hold raw keys KA = A and KB = Aˆ and KA = KB with probability at least 1− εEC.
Due to the communication from Alice to Bob leakEC bits of information are leaked to the adversary. The
following guarantee follows for the described protocol [RW05]:
leakEC ≤ Hε
′
EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
, (21)
for εcEC = ε
′
EC + εEC and where H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) is evaluated on the state in an honest implementation
of the protocol. For example, for quantum channels with an i.i.d. noise model H
ε′EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
can be
22We remark that in Step 2 of Protocol 2 Alice and Bob choose Ti together (or exchange its value between them) in every
round of the protocol and choose their inputs accordingly. This is in contrast to choosing Alice and Bob’s input from a product
distribution and then adding a sifting step, as usually done in QKD protocols. It follows from our proof technique that making
Ti public as we do dose not compromise the security of the protocol.
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bounded by above using the asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09] (see Equation (29) below for the
explicit bound in that case). If a larger fraction of errors occur when running the actual DIQKD protocol
(for instance due to adversarial interference) the error correction might not succeed, as Bob will not have
a sufficient amount of information to obtain a good guess of Alice’s bits. If so this will be detected with
probability at least 1− εEC and the protocol will abort.
Parameter estimation. After the error correction step, Bob has all of the relevant information to perform
parameter estimation from his data alone, without any further communication with Alice. Using B˜ and KB,
Bob sets Ci = wCHSH
(
Aˆi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
= wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds and Ci =⊥ otherwise.
He aborts if the fraction of successful game rounds is too low, that is, if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n .
As Bob does the estimation using his guess of Alice’s bits, the probability of aborting in this step in an
honest implementation, εcPE, is bounded by
εcPE ≤ Pr
(∑
j
Cj < (ωexp − δest) ·
∑
j
Tj
∣∣∣KA = KB)+ Pr (KA 6= KB and EC does not abort)
≤ εcEA + εEC , (22)
since conditioned on the error correction protocol succeeding the probability of aborting in the honest case
is exactly as in the entropy accumulation protocol (Protocol 1).
Privacy amplification. Finally, Alice and Bob use a (quantum-proof) privacy amplification protocol PA
(which takes some random seed S as input) to create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length ℓ, which are close
to ideal keys, i.e., uniformly random and independent of the adversary’s knowledge.
For simplicity we use universal hashing [RK05] as the privacy amplification protocol in the analysis below.
Any other quantum-proof strong extractor, e.g., Trevisan’s extractor [DPVR12], can be used for this task
and the analysis can be easily adapted.
The secrecy of the final key depends only on the privacy amplification protocol used and the value of
Hεsmin(A|XYTOE), evaluated on the state at the end of the protocol, conditioned on not aborting. For
universal hashing, for every εPA, εs ∈ (0, 1) a secure key of maximal length
ℓ = Hεsmin(A|XYTOE)− 2 log
1
εPA
(23)
is produced with probability23 at least 1− εPA − εs.
The main theorem of this section is the following security result for Protocol 2:
Theorem 12. The DIQKD protocol given in Protocol 2 is (εsQKD, ε
c
QKD, ℓ)-secure according to Definition 3,
with εsQKD ≤ εEC + εPA + εs + εEA, εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC, and
ℓ = n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC))− 2 log
(
ε−1PA
)
,
(24)
where ηopt is specified in Equation (7).
In Section 5.5 we plot the resulting key rates, ℓ/n, for different choices of parameters.
Theorem 12 follows by combining Lemmas 13 and 15 that we prove in the following sections.
23εPA is the error probability of the extractor when it is applied on a normalised state satisfying the relevant min-entropy
bound. For universal hashing, when only a bound on the smooth min-entropy is given the smoothing parameter εs should
be added to the error εPA. When working with other extractors one should adapt the parameters accordingly; see [AFPS15,
Section 4.3].
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Protocol 2 CHSH-based DIQKD protocol
Arguments:
D – untrusted device of two components that can play CHSH repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
EC – error correction protocol which leaks leakEC bits and has error probability εEC
PA – privacy amplification protocol with error probability εPA
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-4:
2: Alice and Bob choose a random Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) and otherwise Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and B˜i respectively.
5: Error correction: Alice and Bob apply the error correction protocol EC, communicating O in the
process. If EC aborts they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they obtain raw keys denoted by KA and KB.
6: Parameter estimation: Using B˜ and KB, Bob sets Ci = wCHSH
(
KBi, B˜i, Xi, Yi
)
for the test rounds
and Ci =⊥ otherwise. He aborts if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n;.
7: Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification protocol PA on KA and KB to
create their final keys K˜A and K˜B of length ℓ as defined in Equation (24).
5.2 The honest implementation
The honest (but possibly noisy) implementation of the protocol is one where the device D performs in every
round i of the protocol the measurements Maixi ⊗Mbiyi on Alice and Bob’s state ρQAQB . The state and
measurements are such that the winning probability achieved in the CHSH game in a single round is ωexp.
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For the measurements (Xi, Yi) = (0, 2) we denote the quantum bit error rate, i.e., the probability that
Ai 6= Bi while using these measurements, by Q. Thus, in the honest case we assume the device D behaves
in an i.i.d. manner (and in particular an i.i.d. noise model for the quantum channels used in the protocol):
it is initialised in an i.i.d. bipartite state, ρ⊗nQAQB , on which it makes i.i.d. measurements.
As an example, one possible realisation of such an implementation is the following. Alice and Bob share
the two-qubit Werner state ρQAQB = (1−ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+νI/4 for |Φ+〉 = 1/
√
2 (|00〉+ |11〉) and ν ∈ [0, 1]. The
state ρQAQB arises, e.g., from the state |Φ+〉 after going through a depolarisation channel. For every i ∈ [n],
Alice’s measurements Xi = 0 and Xi = 1 correspond to σz and σx respectively and Bob’s measurements
Yi = 0, Yi = 1, and Yi = 2 to
σz+σx√
2
, σz−σx√
2
and σz respectively. The winning probability in the CHSH game
(restricted to Xi, Yi ∈ {0, 1}) using these measurements on ρQAQB is ωexp = 2+
√
2(1−ν)
4 and Q =
ν
2 .
5.3 Completeness
The completeness of the protocol follows from the honest i.i.d. implementation described in Section 5.2 and
the completeness of the entropy accumulation protocol as shown in Section 3.2.
Lemma 13. Protocol 2 is complete with completeness error εcQKD ≤ εcEC+εcEA+εEC. That is, the probability
that the protocol aborts for an honest implementation of the device D is at most εcQKD.
Proof. There are two steps at which Protocol 2 may abort: after the error correction (Step 5) or in the
Bell violation estimation (Step 6). By the union bound, the total probability of aborting is at most the
24Note that in our notation, the noise that affects the winning probability in the CHSH game is already included in ωexp.
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probability of aborting in each of these steps. Using this and Equation (22) we get:
εcQKD ≤ εcEC + εcPE ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC .
5.4 Soundness
To establish soundness, first note that by definition, as long as the protocol does not abort it produces a
key of length ℓ. Therefore it remains to verify correctness, which depends on the error correction step, and
security, which is based on the privacy amplification step. To prove security we start with Lemma 14, in
which we assume that the error correction step is successful. We then use it to prove soundness in Lemma 15.
Let Ω˜ denote the event of Protocol 2 not aborting and the EC protocol being successful, and let
ρ˜AB˜XYTOE|Ω˜ be the state at the end of the protocol, conditioned on this event.
Success of the privacy amplification step relies on the min-entropyHεsmin(A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ being sufficiently
large. The following lemma connects this quantity to H
εs
4
min(AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω , on which a lower bound is
provided by Corollary 11.
Lemma 14. For any device D, let ρ˜ be the state generated in Protocol 2 right before the privacy amplification
step, Step 7. Let ρ˜|Ω˜ be the state conditioned on not aborting the protocol and success of the EC protocol.
Then, for any εEA, εEC, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
(25)
Proof. Consider the following events:
1. Ω: the event of not aborting in the entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1. This happens when the
Bell violation, calculated using Alice and Bob’s outputs (and inputs), is sufficiently high.
2. Ωˆ: Suppose Alice and Bob run Protocol 1, and then execute the EC protocol. The event Ωˆ is defined
by Ω and KB = A.
3. Ω˜: the event of not aborting the DIQKD protocol, Protocol 2, and KB = A.
The state ρ|Ωˆ then denotes the state at the end of Protocol 1 conditioned on Ωˆ.
As we are only interested in the case where the EC protocol outputs the correct guess of Alice’s bits,
that is KB = A (which happens with probability 1− εEC), we have ρ˜AXYTE|Ω˜ = ρAXYTE|Ωˆ (note B˜ and B
were traced out from ρ˜ and ρ respectively). Hence,
Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ˜|Ω˜ = H
εs
min (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ . (26)
Using the chain rule given in [Tom15, Lemma 6.8] together with Equation (26) we get that
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ H
εs
min (A|XYTE)ρ˜|Ω˜ − leakEC
= Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC . (27)
To apply Corollary 11 it remains to relate Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ to H
ε′s
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ for some ε
′
s. For
this we first write
Hεsmin (A|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ ≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ −H
εs
4
max (B|AXYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ −H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
,
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where the first inequality is due to the chain rule [Tom15, Equation (6.57)] and the second is due to strong
sub-additivity of the smooth max-entropy.
One can now apply the EAT to upper bound H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ in the following way. We use Theorem 7
with the replacements AB→ B, I→ T, E → E. The Markov conditions B1,...,i−1 ↔ T1,...,i−1E ↔ Ti then
trivially hold and the condition on the max-tradeoff function reads
fmax(p) ≥ sup
σRi−1R′ :Ni(σ)
H (Bi|TiR′)Ni(σ) .
By the definition of the EAT channels {Ni}, Bi 6=⊥ only for Ti = 1, which happens with probability γ.
Hence, for any state σRi−1R′ we have,
H (Bi|TiR′)Ni(σ) ≤ H (Bi|Ti)Ni(σ) ≤ γ
and the max-tradeoff function is simply fmax(p) = γ for any p (and thus ‖▽fmax‖∞ = 0). Applying25
Theorem 7 with this choice of fmax we get
H
εs
4
max (B|TE)ρ|Ωˆ < γn+
√
n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) . (28)
Combing Equation (27) with the above inequalities we get that
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ H
εs
4
min (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ − leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Finally, note that by applying the EAT on ρ|Ωˆ, as in Corollary 11, we have that either 1 − Pr(Ωˆ) ≥
1− εEA − εEC, or
H
εs
4
min(AB|XYTE)ρ|Ωˆ > n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC) .
The last two equations together give us the desired bound on Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ : either the protocol
aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥ n · ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γn−√n2 log 7
√
1− 2 log (εs/4 · (εEA + εEC)) .
Using Lemma 14, we prove that Protocol 2 is sound.
Lemma 15. For any device D let ρ˜ be the state generated using Protocol 2. Then either the protocol aborts
with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC or it is (εEC + εPA+ εs)-correct-and-secret while producing keys
of length ℓ, as defined in Equation (24).
Proof. Denote all the classical public communication during the protocol by J = XYTOS where S is the
seed used in the privacy amplification protocol PA. Denote the final state of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end
of Protocol 2, conditioned on not aborting, by ρ˜K˜AK˜BJE|Ω˜.
We consider two cases. First assume that the EC protocol was not successful (but did not abort). Then
Alice and Bob’s final keys might not be identical. This happens with probability at most εEC.
Otherwise, assume the EC protocol was successful, i.e., KB = A. In that case, Alice and Bob’s keys must
be identical also after the final privacy amplification step. That is, conditioned on KB = A, K˜A = K˜B.
We continue to show that in this case the key is also secret. The secrecy depends only on the privacy
amplification step, and for universal hashing a secure key is produced as long as Equation (23) holds. Hence,
25Here a slightly more general version of the EAT than the one given in this paper is needed, in which the event Ω can be
defined via A,B,X, Y and not only C; see [DFR16] for the details.
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a uniform and independent key of length ℓ as in Equation (24) is produced by the privacy amplification step
unless the smooth min-entropy is not high enough (i.e., the bound in Equation (25) does not hold) or the
privacy amplification protocol was not successful, which happens with probability at most εPA + εs.
According to Lemma 14, either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA − εEC, or the
entropy is sufficiently high for us to have
‖ρ˜K˜AJE|Ω˜ − ρUl ⊗ ρ˜JE‖1 ≤ εPA + εs .
Combining both cases above we get that Protocol 2 is sound (that is, it produces identical and secret
keys of length ℓ for Alice and Bob) with soundness error at most εEC + εPA + εs.
5.5 Key rate analysis
Theorem 12 establishes a relation between the length ℓ of the secure key produced by our protocol and the
different error terms. As this relation, given in Equation (24), is somewhat hard to visualise, we analyse the
key rate r = ℓ/n for some specific choices of parameters and compare it to the key rates achieved in device-
dependent QKD with finite resources [SR08a, SR08b] and DIQKD with infinite resources and a restricted
set of attacks [PAB+09].
The key rate depends on the amount of leakage of information due to the error correction step, which
in turn depends on the honest implementation of the protocol. We use the honest i.i.d. implementation
described in Section 5.2 and assume that in the honest case the state of each round is the two-qubit Werner
state ρQAQB = (1−ν) |φ+〉 〈φ+|+νI/4 (and the measurements are as described in Section 5.2). The quantum
bit error rate is then Q = ν2 and the expected winning probability is ωexp =
2+
√
2(1−2Q)
4 .
We emphasise that this is an assumption regarding the honest implementation and it does not in any
way restrict the actions of the adversary (and, in particular, the types of imperfections in the device).
Furthermore, the analysis done below can be adapted to any other honest implementation of interest.
5.5.1 Leakage due to error correction
To compare the rates we first need to explicitly upper bound the leakage of information due to the error
correction protocol, leakEC . As mentioned before, this can be done by evaluating H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) on Alice
and Bob’s state in an honest i.i.d. implementation of the protocol, described in Section 5.2.
For this we first use the following relation between Hε0 and H
ε′
max [TSSR11, Lemma 18]:
H
ε′EC
0 (A|B˜XYT) ≤ H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYT
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
The non-asymptotic version of the asymptotic equipartition property [TCR09, Theorem 9] (see also [Tom12,
Result 5]) tells us that
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYT
)
≤ nH(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
nδ(ε′EC, τ) ,
for τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1 and δ(ε′EC, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
.
For the honest implementation of Protocol 2 Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) = 1 and
H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) =Pr(Ti = 0) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
Pr(Ti = 1) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 0)+
γ ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYi, Ti = 1)
= (1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp) ,
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Figure 5: The expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ as a function of the quantum bit error rate Q for several values
of the expected number of rounds n¯. For n¯ = 1015 the curve essentially coincides with the curve for the
i.i.d. asymptotic case [PAB+09, Equation (12)]. The following values for the error terms were chosen:
εEC = 10
−10, εsQKD = 10
−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
where the first equality follows from the definition of conditional entropy and the second from the way Ti is
chosen in Protocol 2. The last equality holds since for generation rounds the error rate (i.e., the probability
that Ai and B˜i differ) in the honest case is Q and for test rounds given B˜i, Xi and Yi Bob can guess Ai
correctly with probability ωexp.
We thus have
H
ε′EC
0
(
A|B˜XYT
)
≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] +
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
.
Plugging this into Equation (21) we get
leakEC ≤ n [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] +
√
n4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log
(
8/ε′2EC
)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
(29)
5.5.2 Key rate curves
In Appendix B a slightly modified protocol is considered in which, instead of fixing the number of rounds in
the protocol, only the expected number of rounds is fixed.
The completeness and soundness proofs follow the same lines as the proofs above, as detailed in Ap-
pendix B. The analysis presented in the appendix leads to improved key rates for the modified protocol, and
are the ones presented here.
In Figure 5 the expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ is plotted as a function of the quantum bit error rate Q for
several values of the expected number of rounds n¯. For n¯ = 1015 the curve already essentially coincides
with the key rate achieved in the asymptotic i.i.d. case, that is, when restricting the adversary to collective
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Figure 6: The expected key rate r = ℓ/n¯ as a function of the expected number of rounds n¯ for several values
of the quantum bit error rate Q. For Q = 0.5%, 2.5%, and 5% the achieved key rates are approximatly r =
87%, 53%, and 22% respectively. The following values for the error terms were chosen: εEC = 10
−10, εsQKD =
10−5 and εcQKD = 10
−2.
attacks [PAB+09, Equation (12)] (see also Figure 2 therein). As the key rate for the asymptotic i.i.d. case
was shown to be optimal in [PAB+09] (for practically the same protocol) it acts as an upper bound on the
key rate and the amount of tolerable noise for the general case considered in this work. Hence, for large
enough number of rounds our key rate becomes optimal and the protocol can tolerate up to the maximal
error rate Q = 7.1%.
In an asymptotic analysis (i.e., with infinite resources n¯→∞) it is well understood that the soundness and
completeness errors εsQKD, ε
c
QKD should tend to zero as n¯ increases. However, in the non-asymptotic scenario
considered here these errors are always finite. We therefore fix some values for them which are considered to
be realistic and relevant for actual applications. We choose the parameters such that the security parameters
are at least as good (and in general even better) as in [SR08a], such that a fair comparison can be made.
All other parameters are chosen in a consistent way while (roughly) optimising the key rate.
In Figure 6 r is plotted as a function of n¯ for several values of Q. As can be seen from the figure, the
achieved rates are significantly higher than those achieved in previous works. Moreover, they are practically
comparable to the key rates achieved in device-dependent QKD (see Figure 1 in [SR08a]). The main difference
between the curves for the device-dependent case and the independent one is the minimal value of n¯ which
is required for a positive key rate. (That is, for the protocols considered in [SR08a] one can get a positive
key rate with less rounds.) It is possible that by further optimising the parameters a positive key rate can
also be achieved in our setting in the regime n¯ = 104 − 106 for the different error rates.
6 Randomness expansion
We show how the entropy accumulation protocol can be used to perform randomness expansion. This can
be achieved based on any non-local game for which one is able to prove a good bound in Equation (4). For
concreteness we focus on the CHSH game, for which an explicit bound is provided by Corollary 11. Although
the protocol can be used to achieve larger expansion factors, we give specific bounds that optimise the linear
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output rate, under the assumption that a small linear number of uniformly random bits is available to the
experimenter for the execution of the protocol.
In order to minimise the amount of randomness required to execute the protocol we adapt the main
entropy accumulation protocol, Protocol 1, by deterministically choosing inputs in the generation rounds
from Xg = {0} and Yg = {0}. In particular there is no use for the input 2 to the B device, and no randomness
is required for the generation rounds. 26 Aside from the last step of randomness amplification the remainder
of the protocol is essentially the same as Protocol 1 (in its instantiation with the CHSH game considered in
Section 4). The complete protocol is described as Protocol 3.
Protocol 3 Randomness expansion protocol
Arguments:
G – CHSH game restricted to Xt = Yt = {0, 1}.
D – untrusted device of two components that can play G repeatedly
n ∈ N+ – number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] – expected fraction of test rounds
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every round i ∈ [n] do Steps 2-5:
2: Bob chooses a random bit Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose (Xi, Yi) = (0, 0). If Ti = 1 they choose uniformly random inputs
(Xi, Yi) ∈ Xt × Yt.
4: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
5: If Ti = 1 they set Ci = w(Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi).
6: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j Cj < (ωexpγ − δest) · n.
7: They return Ext(AB,Z) where Ext is the extractor from Lemma 18 and Z is a uniformly random seed.
Corollary 11 provides a lower bound on the min-entropy generated by the protocol. Given we are
concerned here not only with generating randomness, but also with expanding the amount of randomness
initially available to users of the protocol, we now evaluate the total number of random bits that is needed
to execute Protocol 3.
Input randomness. Random bits are required to select which rounds are generation rounds, i.e. the
random variable T, to select inputs to the devices in the testing rounds, i.e. those for which Ti = 0, and to
select the seed for the extractor in Step 7.
The random variables Ti are chosen independently according to a biased Bernoulli(γ) distribution. The
following lemma shows that approximately γ3n uniformly random bits are sufficient to generate the Ti,
provided one allows for the possibility of a small deviation error.
Lemma 16. Let γ > 0. There is an efficient procedure such that for any integer n, given r = 6γn uniformly
random bits as inputs the procedure either aborts, with probability at most εSA = exp(−Ω(γ3 log−2 γn)), or
outputs n bits T1, . . . , Tn whose distribution is within statistical distance at most εSA of n i.i.d. Bernoulli(γ)
random variables.
Proof. It is well-known that using the interval algorithm [H+97] it is possible to sample exactly from m i.i.d.
Bernoulli(γ) random variables using an expected number of random bits at most h(γ)m + 2; furthermore
the maximum number of random bits needed is at most Cm log γ−1 for some constant C.
In order to obtain a bound on the maximum number of random bits used that holds with high probability,
let α = h(γ) and partition {1, . . . , n} into at most t = ⌈αn⌉ chunks of m = ⌈1/α⌉ consecutive integers each.
26This requires both users to know which rounds are selected as generation rounds, i.e. to share the random variable Ti. For
the purposes of randomness expansion this does not even require communication as we may assume the parties are co-located.
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Suppose we repeat the interval algorithm for each chunk. Let Ni be the number of uniform bits used to
generate the Tj associated with the i-th chunk. Then by the above E[Ni] ≤ h(γ)m+2 and Ni ≤ Cm log γ−1.
Applying the Hoeffding inequality,
Pr
( t∑
i=1
Ni > 2(h(γ)m+ 2)t
)
≤ e−C′
(h(γ)m+2)2
m2 log2 γ−1 t ≤ e−C′′
γ3
log2 γ−1 n
for some constants C′, C′′ > 0 and given our choice of α.
Remark 17. If one is willing to settle for a bound on the number of uniform bits used in expectation then
using the procedure from [H+97] it is possible to exactly sample n i.i.d. Bernoulli(γ) random variables using
an expected number of random bits at most h(γ)n+ 2.
It remains to account for the random bits required to generate inputs in the testing rounds, for which Ti =
0. By Hoeffding’s inequality there are at most 2γn such rounds except with probability exp(−Ω(γ2n)) ≤ εSA
for large enough n. Together with Lemma 16 we conclude that 10γn uniformly random bits are sufficient to
execute the protocol with a probability of success (up to but not including step 6) at least 1− e−Ω˜(γ3)n. We
also note that if one is only concerned with the expected number of random bits used then (h(γ) + γ)n+ 2
bits are sufficient.
Extraction. In the last step of the protocol, Step 7, the user applies a quantum-proof extractor to AB
in order to produce a random string that is close to being uniformly distributed. This step requires the
use of an additional seed of uniformly random bits. We use the following construction based on Trevisan’s
extractor, designed to maximise the output length while not using too much seed.
Lemma 18. For any δ > 0 there is a c = c(δ) > 0 such that the following holds. For all large enough integer
n and any k ≥ δn there is an efficient procedure Ext : {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m such that d = ⌈δn⌉ and
m = ⌈k−9 log k⌉, and is such that for εEX = exp(−c(n/ logn)1/2) and any classical-quantum state ρAE such
that Hmin(A|E)εEXρ ≥ k it holds that
‖ρExt(A,Z)ZE − ρUm ⊗ ρUd ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 2εEX ,
where Z ∈ {0, 1}d is a uniformly distributed random seed and ρUm , ρUd are totally mixed states on m and d
bits respectively.
Proof. We use the construction given in [DPVR12, Corollary 5.1]. To get the parameters stated here we
note that provided c is chosen small enough with respect to δ our choice of εEX ensures that the seed length
d = O(log2(n/εEX) logm) can be made smaller than δn. The conclusion on the trace distance follows from
the guarantee of strong extractor given by [DPVR12, Corollary 5.1] using an argument similar to the proof
of [AFPS15, Lemma 17].
We state the results of the above discussions as the following theorem stating the guarantees of the
randomness expansion protocol.
Theorem 19. Let γ, δ > 0. Let εEX be as in Lemma 18. Then for all large enough n, εEA ∈ (0, 1),
and 0 < εs ≤ εEX, Protocol 1 is an (εcEA, 2εEX)-secure [(h(γ) + γ + δ)n + 2] → [n · ηopt(εs, εEA) − 9 logn]
randomness expansion protocol. That is, either Protocol 1 aborts with probability greater than εEA or it
generates a string of length m ≥ n · ηopt(εs, εEA)− 9 logn (where ηopt is defined in Equation (7)) such that
‖ρSRE − ρUm ⊗ ρUR ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ 2εEX ,
where R is a register holding all the initial random bits used in the protocol. Furthermore, the execution of
the protocol requires at most |R| ≤ (h(γ) + γ + δ)n + 2 uniformly random bits on expectation, and at most
(10γ + δ)n random bits with probability at least 1− 2εSA (as defined in Lemma 16).
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Proof. Let D be any device and ρ the state (as defined in Equation (1)) generated right before Step 6 of
Protocol 3. Let Ω (as defined in Equation (2)) be the event that the protocol does not abort, and ρ|Ω the
state conditioned on Ω. Then, applying Corollary 11 we obtain that for any εEA, εs ∈ (0, 1), either the
protocol aborts with probability greater than 1− εEA or
Hεsmin (AB|XYTE)ρ|Ω > n · ηopt(εs, εEA) , (30)
where ηopt is defined in Equation (7).
27 Given the bound Equation (30), the guarantee on m claimed in the
theorem follows from Lemma 18.
Finally, completeness of the protocol follows directly from completeness of the entropy accumulation
protocol, Protocol 1, as stated in Lemma 8.
Assuming a choice δ = γ, the number of random bits required in the protocol scales linearly, roughly
as ∼ 3γn. For γ → 0 the values of ηopt plotted in Figure 3 give a good idea of the rate of randomness
expansion that can be achieved from Protocol 3 for different choices of the security parameters. The rate
is to be compared to the optimal rate that was shown achievable for randomness expansion in the case of
classical adversaries only in [PAM+10] (Figure 2; see also [PM13]). In the range of small constant γ > 0 we
obtain essentially the same rate, but our result holds against quantum adversaries. The rate is much better
than the ones obtained in [VV12, MS14a].
7 Open questions
Several questions are left open.
1. Is it possible to get a better dependency of the rate curves on the number of rounds n? As can be seen
from Figures 3 and 5 our rate curves approach (and essentially coincide) with the optimal curves as the
number of rounds increases. One thing that can perhaps still be further optimised is the dependency
on the number of rounds, or in other words, how fast the curves approach the optimal curve. The
explicit dependency on n given in Equation (24) is already close to optimal, but the numerical analysis
used to plot the curves can be made somewhat better for the range of n = 104 − 106. Although this
seems like a minor issue, it can make actual implementations more feasible.
2. Are there similar protocols, based on a different Bell inequality, that can lead to better entropy rates?
To apply our proof to other Bell inequalities one should find a good bound on the min-tradeoff function,
as done in Equation (13) for the CHSH inequality. For many Bell inequalities such bounds are known,
but for the min-entropy instead of the von Neumann entropy. In most cases using a bound on the
min-entropy will result in far from optimal rate curves. Therefore, to adapt our protocol to other
Bell inequalities one should probably bound the min-tradeoff function using the von Neumann entropy
directly. Unfortunately, we do not know of any general technique to achieve such tight bounds.
3. Are there other protocols, e.g., with two-way classical post-processing, which achieve better key rates?
The optimality of our key rates is only with respect to the structure of the considered protocol.
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Appendices
A Summary of Parameters, constants, and variables
Symbol Meaning Relation to other parameters
n ∈ N+ Number of rounds
γ ∈ (0, 1] Expected fraction of Bell violation estimation rounds
ωexp ∈ [0, 1] Expected winning probability in an honest (perhapsnoisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) Width of the statistical confidence intervalfor the Bell violation estimation test
εs Smoothing parameter
εcEA Completeness error of the entropy accumulation protocol Given in Eq. (3)
εEA The error probability of the entropy accumulation protocol
leakEC The leakage of the error correction protocol Given in Eq. (21)
εEC, ε
′
EC Error probabilities of the error correction protocol
εcEC Completeness error of the error correction protocol ε
c
EC = ε
′
EC + εEC
εcPE Completeness error of the parameter estimation step Given in Eq. (22)
εPA Error probability of the privacy amplification protocol Given in Eq. (23)
ℓ Final key length in the DIQKD protocol Given in Eq. (24)
εcQKD Completeness error of the DIQKD protocol ε
c
QKD ≤ εcEC + εcEA + εEC
εsQKD Soundness error of the DIQKD protocol ε
s
QKD ≤ εEC + εPA + εs
εSA Error probability of the input sampling procedure used Given in Lemma 16
in the randomness expansion protocol
εEX Error probability of the extractor used in the Given in Lemma 18
randomness expansion protocol
Table 1: Parameters and constants used throughout the paper
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Random variables and systems Meaning
Xi ∈ X Alice’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Yi ∈ Y Bob’s input in round i ∈ [n]
Ai ∈ A Alice’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Bi ∈ B Bob’s output in round i ∈ [n]
Ti ∈ {0, 1}
Indicator of the estimation test in round i:
Ti =
{
0 i’th round is not a test round
1 i’th round is a test round
Fi ∈ {0, 1} A random uniform bit for the symmetrisation step in round i ∈ [n]
Ci ∈ {⊥, 0, 1}
Indicator of the correlation in the test rounds:
Ci =


⊥ Ti = 0
0 Ti = 1 and the test fails
1 Ti = 1 and the test succeeds .
E Register of Eve’s quantum state
Ri
Register of the (unknown) quantum state ρiQAQB of Alice and
Bob’s devices after step i of the protocol, for i ∈ {0} ∪ [n].
Table 2: Random variables and quantum systems used throughout the paper
B An improved dependency on the test probability γ
In this section we show how the EAT can be used in a slightly different way than what was done in the main
text. This results in an entropy rate which has a better dependency on the probability of a test round γ,
compared to the entropy rate given in Equation (7) in Section 4. The improved entropy rate derived here is
the one used for calculating the key rates of the DIQKD protocol is Section 5.5.2.
B.1 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
We use a different entropy accumulation protocol, given as Protocol 4. In this modified protocol instead of
considering each round separately we consider blocks of rounds. A block is defined by a sequence of rounds:
in each round a test is carried out with probability γ (and otherwise the round is a generation round). The
block ends when a test round is being performed and then the next block begins. If for smax rounds there was
no test, the block ends without performing a test and the next begins. Thus, the blocks can be of different
length, but they all consist at most smax rounds.
In this setting, instead of fixing the number of rounds n in the beginning of the protocol, we fix the
number of blocks m. The expected length of block is
s¯ =
∑
s∈[smax]
[
s(1− γ)(s−1)γ
]
+ smax(1− γ)smax = 1− (1− γ)
smax
γ
=
∑
s∈[smax]
[
(1− γ)(s−1)
]
. (31)
The expected number of rounds is denoted by n¯ = m · s¯.
Compared to the main text, we now have a RV C˜j ∈ {0, 1,⊥} for each block, instead of each round.
Alice and Bob set C˜j to be 0 or 1 depending on the result of the game in the block’s test round (i.e., the
last round of the block), or C˜j =⊥ if a test round was not carried out in the block. By the definition of the
blocks we have Pr[C˜j =⊥] = (1− γ)smax .
Note that the symmetrisation step was dropped in Protocol 4 just for simplicity, as it plays no role in
the considered modification; it can (and should) be handled exactly as done in Section 4.
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Protocol 4 Modified entropy accumulation protocol
Arguments:
G – two-player non-local game
Xg,Xt ⊂ X – generation and test inputs for Alice
Yg,Yt ⊂ Y – generation and test inputs for Bob
D – untrusted device of (at least) two components that can play G repeatedly
m ∈ N+ – number of blocks
smax ∈ N+ –maximal length of a block
γ ∈ (0, 1] – probability of a test round
ωexp – expected winning probability in G for an honest (perhaps noisy) implementation
δest ∈ (0, 1) – width of the statistical confidence interval for the estimation test
1: For every block j ∈ [m] do Steps 2-9:
2: Set i = 0 and Cj =⊥.
3: If i ≤ smax:
4: Set i = i+ 1.
5: Alice and Bob choose Ti ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
6: If Ti = 0 Alice and Bob choose inputs Xi ∈ Xg and Yi ∈ Yg respectively. If Ti = 1 they choose
inputs Xi ∈ Xt and Yi ∈ Yt.
7: Alice and Bob use D with Xi, Yi and record their outputs as Ai and Bi respectively.
8: If Ti = 0 Bob updates Bi to Bi =⊥.
9: If Ti = 1 they set C˜j = w (Ai, Bi, Xi, Yi) and i = smax + 1.
10: Alice and Bob abort if
∑
j∈[m] C˜j < [ωexp (1− (1 − γ)smax)− δest] ·m.
B.2 Modified min-tradeoff function
Below, we apply the EAT on blocks of outputs instead of single rounds directly. Let Mj denote the EAT
channels defined by the actions of Steps 2-9 in Protocol 4 together with the behaviour of the device. It is
easy to verify that Mj fulfil the necessary conditions given in Definition 5.
We now construct a min-tradeoff function forMj . Let p˜ be a probability distribution over {0, 1,⊥}. Our
goal is to find Fmin such that
∀j ∈ [m] Fmin(p˜) ≤ inf
σRj−1R′ :Mj(σ)C˜j=p˜
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
Mj(σ)
, (32)
where ~Aj is a vector of varying length (but at most smax). We use Aj,i to denote the i’th entry of ~Aj and
Aj,i−1j,1 = Aj,1 . . . Aj,i−1. Since we will only be interested in the entropy of ~Aj we can also describe it as a
vector of length smax which is initialised to be all ⊥. For every actual round being performed in the block
the value of Aj,i is updated. Thus, the entries of ~Aj which correspond to rounds which were not performed
do not contribute to the entropy. We use similar notation for the other vectors of RVs.
To lower-bound the right-hand side of Equation (32) we first use the chain rule
H
(
~Aj ~Bj| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) . (33)
Next, for every i ∈ [smax],
H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 ) =Pr[T j,i−1j,1 = ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
+ Pr[T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0]H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 6= ~0)
=(1 − γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0)
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since the entropy is not zero only if the i’th round is being performed in the block, i.e., if a test was not
performed before that round. Plugging this into Eq. (33) we get
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
=
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)H(Aj,iBj,i| ~Xj ~YjR′Aj,i−1j,1 Bj,i−1j,1 T j,smaxj,i T j,i−1j,1 = ~0) .
Each term in the sum can now be identified as the entropy of a single round. We can therefore use the
bound derived in the main text, as given in Equation (12). For this we denote by ωi the winning probability
in the i’th round (given that a test was not performed before). Then it holds that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1 − γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
, (34)
where, by the actions of the EAT channel Mj , the ωi’s must fulfil the constraint
p˜(1) =
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi . (35)
Note that, similarly to what was done in the main text, we only need to consider p˜ for which p˜(1)+ p˜(0) =
1 − (1 − γ)smax (otherwise the condition on the min-tradeoff function is trivial, as the infimum is over an
empty set).
To find the min-tradeoff function Fmin(p˜) we therefore need to minimise Equation (34) under the con-
straint of Equation (35). The following lemma shows that the minimum is achieved when all ωi are equal.
Lemma 20. The minimum of the function given on the righthand-side of Equation (34) over ωi constrained
by Equation (35) is achieved for ω∗i =
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax for all i ∈ [smax].
Proof. Let ~ω = ω1, . . . , ωsmax and
f(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
(1 − γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)]
;
g(~ω) ≡
∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ωi − p˜(1) .
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, we should look for ~ω∗ such that g(~ω∗) = 0 and ∇f(~ω∗) =
−λ∇g(~ω∗) for some constant λ. ∇f(~ω∗) = −λ∇g(~ω∗) implies that for any i,
(1− γ)(i−1) d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ(1− γ)(i−1)
and therefore
d
dωi
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16ωi (ωi − 1) + 3
)] ∣∣∣
ω∗i
= −λγ .
The function on the left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing. Hence, it must be that all ω∗i
are equal to some constant ω∗.
Lastly, we must have g(~ω∗) = 0. Thus,∑
i∈[smax]
γ(1− γ)(i−1)ω∗ − p˜(1) = 0
which means
ω∗ =
p˜(1)∑
i∈[smax] γ(1− γ)(i−1)
=
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax .
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Plugging the minimal values of ωi into Equation (34) we get that
H
(
~Aj ~Bj | ~Xj ~Yj ~TjR′
)
≥
∑
i∈[smax]
(1− γ)(i−1)
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
= s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
16
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1− (1− γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
,
where we used Equation (31) to get the last equality.
From this point we can follow the same steps as in Section 4 (cutting and gluing the function etc.). The
resulting min-tradeoff function is given by
g(p˜) =


s¯
[
1− h
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
16 p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax
(
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax − 1
)
+ 3
)]
p˜(1)
1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
0, 2+
√
2
4
]
s¯ p˜(1)1−(1−γ)smax ∈
[
2+
√
2
4 , 1
]
,
Fmin (p˜, p˜t) =
{
g (p˜) p˜(1) ≤ p˜t(1)
d
dp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜(1) +
(
g(p˜t)− ddp˜(1)g(p˜)
∣∣
p˜t
· p˜t(1)
)
p˜(1) > p˜t(1) .
The min-tradeoff function given above is effectively identical to the one derived in the main text; although
it gives us a bound on the von Neumann entropy in a block, instead of a single round, this bound is exactly
the expected length of a block, s¯, times the entropy in one round. For smax = 1 the min-tradeoff function
constructed in the main text is retrieved.
B.3 Modified entropy rate
Since we apply the EAT on the blocks, the entropy rate is now defined to be the entropy per block. We
therefore get
η(p˜, p˜t, εs, εe) = Fmin (p˜, p˜t)− 1√
m
2
(
log(1 + 2 · 2smax3smax) + ‖ d
dp˜(1)
g(p˜)‖∞
)√
1− 2 log(εs · εe) ,
ηopt(εs, εe) = max
3
4<p˜t(1)<
2+
√
2
4
η(ωexp − δest, p˜t, εs, εe) ,
and the total amount of entropy is given by
Hεsmin (AB|XYTFE)ρ|Ω > m · ηopt(εs, εEA) =
n¯
s¯
· ηopt(εs, εEA) . (36)
By choosing smax = ⌈ 1γ ⌉ the scaling of the entropy rate with γ is better than the rate derived in the main
text. In particular, a short calculation reveals that the second order term scales, roughly, as
√
n¯/γ instead
of
√
n/γ.
B.4 Modified key rate
To get the final key rate we need to repeat the same steps from the main text, but this time applied to
random variables of varying length.
For this we first observe that, with high probability, the actual number of rounds, n, cannot be much
larger than the expected number of rounds n¯. Let Si be the RV describing the length of block i, for i ∈ [m],
and N the RV describing the total number of rounds. Then N = S1 + · · · + Sm. Since all the Si are
independent, identical, and have values in
[
1, 1γ
]
we have
Pr[N ≥ n¯+ t] ≤ exp
[
− 2t
2γ2
m(1− γ)2
]
.
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Let εt = exp
[
− 2t2γ2m(1−γ)2
]
then
t =
√
−m(1− γ)
2 log εt
2γ2
.
The first step in the derivation of the key rate which needs to be changed is the one given in Equation (28).
The quantity that needs to be upper bounded is H
εs
4
max (B|TEN)ρ|Ωˆ ; N can be included in the entropy since
its value is fixed by T. By the definition of the smooth max-entropy we have
H
εs
4
max (B|TEN) ≤ H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t) .
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 14 we have
H
εs
4 −
√
εt
max (B|TEN,N ≤ n¯+ t)ρ|Ωˆ < γ(n¯+ t) +
√
n¯+ t2 log 7
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
With this modification and the modified entropy rate given in Equation (36) we get
Hεsmin (A|XYTOE)ρ˜|Ω˜ ≥
n¯
s¯
· ηopt (εs/4, εEA + εEC)− leakEC − 3 log
(
1−
√
1− (εs/4)2
)
−γ(n¯+ t)−√n¯+ t2 log 7
√
1− 2 log ((εs/4−√εt) · (εEA + εEC)) .
Similarly, the amount of leakage due to the error correction step leakEC should be modified as well.
Following the steps in Section 5.5.1, the quantity to be upper bounded is H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYTN
)
. Here as well
we have
H
ε′EC
2
max
(
A|B˜XYTN
)
≤ H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XYTN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
.
The asymptotic equipartition property can be used with the maximal length n¯+ t to get
H
ε′EC
2 −
√
εt
max
(
A|B˜XYTN,N ≤ n¯+ t
)
≤ (n¯+ t) ·H(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) +
√
n¯+ t δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) ,
for τ = 2
√
2Hmax(Ai|B˜iXiYiTi) + 1 and δ(ε′EC − 2
√
εt, τ) = 4 log τ
√
2 log
(
8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2
)
. Continuing
exactly as in Section 5.5.1 we get
leakEC ≤ (n¯+ t) · [(1− γ)h(Q) + γh(ωexp)] +
√
n¯+ t 4 log
(
2
√
2 + 1
)√
2 log (8/(ε′EC − 2
√
εt)2)
+ log
(
8/ε′2EC + 2/ (2− ε′EC)
)
+ log
(
1
εEC
)
.
The parameter εt should be chosen such that the key rate is optimised. The resulting key rates are shown
in Figures 5 and 6 in the main text.
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